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Resumen: En enero de 2003 la OCDE introdujo importantes reformas en los Comentarios al 
Convenio Modelo en relación con el problema la de aplicación de cláusulas internas anti-abuso en un 
contexto internacional. Conforme a la nueva posición de los Comentarios la aplicación de dichas cláusu-
las nunca podría dar lugar a un conflicto con los convenios de doble imposición pues constituyen exclu-
sivamente reglas para determinar los hechos que eventualmente pueden dar lugar al nacimiento de la ob-
ligación tributaria. Nuestro trabajo tiene como objetivo aflorar algunas debilidades de esta posición: 1) 
Resulta jurídicamente inconsistente y promueve la confusión entre transacciones simuladas y elusivas; 
2) Se aparta de la verdadera solución del problema que pasa por el análisis de las técnicas de aplicación 
de normas desde una perspectiva de teoría del Derecho. Conforme a este análisis demostramos cómo 
gran parte de los supuestos de treaty shopping pueden resolverse mediante una correcta interpretación 
de los criterios de imputación de rentas regulados por el Derecho interno. 3) El principio guía elaborado 
por los Comentarios facilita la aplicación de cláusulas generales anti-abuso a transacciones que ni siqui-
era resultan artificiales lo que, a su vez, conduce a que dicha posición sea más que cuestionable desde la 
perspectiva del Derecho Comunitario Europeo.
Palabras clave: Convenios de Doble Imposición, OCDE, Comentarios al Convenio Modelo 
de la OCDE, Cláusulas generales anti-abuso, Simulación, Compra de tratados, Compra de reglas 
del tratado, Imputación de rentas, Interpretación teleológica, Principio-Guía, Negocios totalmente 
artificiales.
Abstract: In January 2003 the OECD issued an important revision to the Commentary to the 
OECD Model concerning the improper use of tax treaties. Based upon the idea that GAARs are rules 
set by domestic tax laws for determining which facts give raise to a tax liability, no conflict may arise 
with tax treaties. Our contribution tries to prove several weaknesses of this argument: 1) It is legally 
inconsistent and encourages confusion between sham and avoidance in the tax field. 2) Moves away 
from the real solution of the issue which requires an in deep analysis on the existence of a universal 
law-application theory (e.g. concepts of interpretation and analogy). According to this, we demonstrate 
that many treaty shopping cases might be faced by a mere interpretation of the attribution rules set up 
by domestic tax laws. 3) The guiding principle elaborated by the OECD Commentaries also merits criti-
cism as it might encourage the application of a domestic GAAR to non-artificial transactions generating 
thereby also serious concerns from a European Law perspective.
Key words: Double Taxation Conventions, OECD, Commentary to the OECD Model, General 
anti-avoidance Rules, Sham, Treaty Shopping, Rule Shopping, Attribution of Income to a Person, Pur-
posive Interpretation, Guiding Principle, Wholly Artificial Arrangements.
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I. Introduction. Scope and structure of the article
1. More frequently than it would be desirable, publications with arguable legal nature are taken, 
by scholars, tax administrations and Courts as real norms and therefore invested with ability to settle 
prior legal disputes. This attitude is based upon a mistaken understanding of binding rules and favours 
a gradual decrease in technical consistency of the publications being it obvious that an organization in-
vested with normative powers may find less incentive to properly justify its decisions than if it is merely 
stating an opinion. Finally, the growing trend towards an ambulatory effect of these publications in re-
lation to the real binding rules to which they are referred, brings forward a whole array of constitutional 
issues normally regarding legal certainty.
2. These reflections might well be applied to the Commentaries on the Articles of the OEDC 
Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (OECD Commentary, hereinafter) especially in relation 
to the improper use of tax treaties, clearly as for the application of the general anti-abuse provisions of 
domestic law in a tax treaty context. It is well known that in January 2003, the OECD issued extensive 
revisions to the OECD Commentary in order to “clarify” this difficult task. If indeed the new version 
of the OECD Commentaries has been well received, by certain scholars and practitioners, regarding 
this issue1, it still fails to properly resolve the problem relying upon solid basics. The inclusion in the 
Commentary of a starting point which might be contentious and the existence of an important amount 
of contradictions in it, accompanied by more than a few gaps, might depreciate the “high persuasive 
value” which has been conferred to the OECD Commentaries2. This value might be even reduced taking 
into account the ambulatory application principle pretended by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the 
OECD which, as it has been stated, might claim for the declining effect of the OECD Commentaries3.
3. As stated before, the 2003 OECD Commentary introduced important changes in relation to 
its article 1 on the improper use of tax treaties. Even though there are excellent descriptions of these 
changes –comparing the 2003 update with its former version4- we should briefly point at them as they 
represent a starting point for our construction. 
4. After decades defending that States wishing to preserve the application of their domestic anti-
avoidance provisions in situations governed by a tax treaty must insert a specific provision to that effect 
in their treaties, the 2003 OECD Commentary dramatically withdrew its former position by partially 
1  sasseville, “Tax Avoidance involving Tax Treaties”, in Jirousek/lanG (eds.) Praxis des Internationalen 
Steuerrechts, Festschrift für Helmut Loukota zum 65. Geburtstag (2005) p. 451 (p. 459 et seq.). sasseville, A Tax 
“Treaty Perspective: Special Issues”, in Maisto (ed.) Tax Treaties and Domestic Law (2006), p. 37 (p. 55 et seq).
2  de	Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse (2008), p. 323.
3  Martín	JiMénez, “The 2003 Revision of the OECD Commentaries on the Improper Use of Tax Treaties: 
A Case for the Declining Effect of the OECD Commentaries?”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 
2004, p. 27-30.
4  Martín	JiMénez, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation (2004), p. 17-20. arnold, “Tax Treaties 
and Tax Avoidance: The 2003 Revisions to the Commentary to the OECD Model”, Bull. IBFD 2004, p. 244-247. 
de	Broe,  International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 377-403.
Table of contents: I. Introduction. Scope and structure of the article. II. The factual ap-
proach to GAAR´S. A technical mistake and a misleading starting point. 1. The factual approach is 
ambiguous. 2. The factual approach is a goal-oriented reasoning. 3. Factual approach and widening 
of the concept of sham: a risk in certain jurisdictions. III. Legal approach to GAAR´S. The need to 
add nuances. 1. Nature and limits of interpretation. 2. Combating intended avoidance. The case of 
attribution. 3. Real avoidance cases. IV. The guiding principle. A critical analysis of its components 
according to legal theory and European Community Law. 1. Main purpose of the transaction. 2. Tax 
treatment contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the treaty. 
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deleting § 7 of the Commentaries on article 1 in which this assertion was included5. In order to justify its 
new approach the Commentary distinguishes between those States for which an abuse of a tax treaty is 
also seen as an abuse of domestic law and those that consider these abuses as being abuses of the treaty 
itself6. The former will not find legal problems by applying domestic anti-abuse provisions in a treaty 
context as far as those are considered part of the basic rules for determining the facts that give raise to 
tax liability, not addressed therefore in tax treaties and not affected by them7. On the other hand, the 
latter States will be able to attack treaty abuses by means of a proper construction of the Convention 
resulting from its object and purpose as well as the obligation of interpreting it in good faith8. Anyways 
in both cases, the application of domestic anti-abuse provisions, in a tax treaty context, does not seem 
troublesome9. In relation to both approaches the OECD Commentaries clarify that it should be not 
lightly assumed that a tax payer is entering into abusive transactions and therefore provides a –so called- 
guiding principle. According to this principle the benefits of a convention should not be available where 
a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements was to secure a more favourable 
tax position and obtaining that more favourable treatment in these circumstances would be contrary to 
the object and purpose of the relevant provisions10.
5. This article tries to critically review the OECD position especially in relation to domestic 
general anti-avoidance rules and general anti-avoidance judicial doctrines (GAARs hereinafter11). For 
these purposes we will follow the very structure of the OECD reasoning, analyzing on the one hand 
the possible application of GAARs in a treaty context and, on the other hand, the guiding principle 
referred above. When it comes to analyzing the first issue, we will first put the OECD statement on the 
factual nature of GAARs - basic rules for determining the facts that give raise to tax liability- under 
scrutiny (section 2) supporting the mere legal nature of these provisions and extracting consequences 
thereof (section 3). After these reflections, we will focus on the guiding principle analyzing its con-
sistency and linkage with the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ, hereinafter) on income 
tax matters (section 4).
II. The factual approach to GAAR’s. A technical mistake and a misleading starting point
6. The OECD Commentaries stress repeatedly that anti-avoidance rules are part of the basic do-
mestic rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which facts give rise to a tax liability, they are 
not addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by them12. This position, frequently labelled 
as factual approach13, has also been used in different States for mere domestic purposes. As we will try 
5  This statement dated back to the 1977 OECD Model which contained the first reference in the Commentary 
to the improper use of tax treaties.
6  OECD Commentaries on Art. 1 § 9.2. and 9.3.
7  OECD Commentaries on Art. 1 § 9.2. This statement is also repeated in OECD Commentaries Art. 1 § 22.1.
8  OECD Commentaries on Art. 1 § 9.3.
9  OECD Commentaries on Art. 1 § 9.4. Nevertheless, as stated by de	Broe, these distinction might be artifi-
cial and unjustified whilst creating differences between those States that will always be faced with the constraints 
imposed by the interpretation rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and those which, might apply 
their domestic anti-abuse rules unrestrictedly (de	Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 
388).
10  OECD Commentaries on Art. 1 § 9.5.
11  Even if the term GAAR should be reserved for domestic legal provisions, in order to achieve a certain 
terminological simplicity we will also use it by referring to anti-abuse judicial doctrines.
12  OECD Commentaries on Art. 1 § 9.2 and § 22.1.
13  Designated as factual approach in: Arnold,  Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 251. 
ziMMer, “Domestic Anti-Avoidance Rules and Tax Treaties – Comment on Brian Arnold’s Article”, Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation, 2005, p. 25-26. arnold;	wheeGel, “The Relationship between Tax Treaties 
and Domestic Anti-abuse Measures”, in Maisto (ed.) Tax Treaties and Domestic Law (2006), p. 91. It has also been 
labeled as fact finding approach (de	Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 390-391) or 
even transactional approach (Goyette, “Tax Treaty Abuse: A Second Look”, Canadian Tax Journal, 2003, Vol 51, 
Nº 2, p. 780 et seq). 
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to demonstrate this approach does hold a bit of ambiguity, at least in its formulation by the OECD, is 
normally used to avoid the real nature of GAARs and might encourage wrong solutions in certain juris-
dictions. These objections must be considered separately.
1. The factual approach is ambiguous
7. The wording of the OECD Commentaries on this issue allows several interpretations. One 
could say that the OECD means by that approach that GAARs are rules that determine the taxable 
event14. But one could also say that, according to the above mentioned words, the OECD considers 
GAARs to be rules establishing the facts to which domestic and conventional provisions are applied. 
Even if we reject a pure factual approach to GAARs, just this second interpretation seems to be in line 
with the Commentaries intentions15. Anyways the OECD’s approach needs clarification.
2. The factual approach is a goal-oriented reasoning
8. The factual approach has not only been suggested in relation to this particular issue but also 
in different contexts. In any case, and as we will try to demonstrate, this approach has always been 
proposed in order to escape the unwelcome consequences of an interpretative approach. This attempt to 
avoid at all costs the interpretative approach implies supporting complicated theories on the relationship 
between facts and law that deserve critical review.
9. The application of a rule, whatever its nature may be, implies the determination of the facts to 
which that rule will be applied. These facts are what the taxpayer really did, without any legal labelling. 
Once these facts have been properly determined they call for the application of a rule be it domestic or 
conventional16. The problem, in abusive transactions, is that the facts will be developed in a way that a 
rule either cannot be applied (abuse through avoidance) or is applied even if not intended for cases of 
the kind (abuse through capture)17. In any case, the application of GAARs to these abuse strategies does 
not and cannot imply a mere determination of the facts but rather a sort of application of the avoided 
or captured rule18. There is little room for doubt that even for tax authorities invested with far-reaching 
powers, faking the existence of certain facts that did not really occur seems excessive. This would be 
equal to depriving rules of validity. 
10. In order to overcome the inconsistencies of this version of the factual approach, a further 
meaning of the term fact has been developed so as to refer to the so called “legal facts” (referred also as 
14  This interpretation matches in fact with the French version of the Commentary (…dispositions determinant 
les faits générateures de l’impôt) as stated by de	Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse, p. 389. 
This seems to be also the position of Martín	JiMénez on stating: “According to Para. 9.2, as long as anti-abuse rules 
affect the taxable event…” (Martín	JiMénez,  Bulletin  for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 19).
15  In fact this second interpretation is supported by a good number of scholars: arnold,  Bulletin for Inter-
national Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 251 de	Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse, p. 
389-391. 
16  It has been suggested that the application process implies two different steps: characterisation of the facts 
and interpretation of the law. These considerations may be valid in a mere theoretical approach but in real ap-
plication cases both characterization and interpretation take place simultaneously. In short, paraphrasing German 
scholars: the eye of the judge wander from the text of the law to the facts and from the facts to the law (kauFMann, 
Analogie un Natur der Sache. 2nd ed. (1982), p. 38). 
17  These are the two main abuse strategies that have been described by German scholars (see the concepts 
of Tatbestandumgehung vs. Tatbestanderschleichung in kruse, Steuerumgehung zwischen Steuervermeidung und 
Steuerhinterziehung, Steuerberater-Jahrbuch, 1978-1979, p. 454-455). Also in Spanish literature: Báez;	lópez, 
“Nuevas perspectivas generales sobre la elusión fiscal y sus consecuencias en la derivación de responsabilidades 
penales. (Comentario a la Sentencia del TS de 30 de abril de 2003, rec. num. 3435/2001)”, Estudios Financieros 
Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación (legislación, consultas, jurisprudencia), nº 251, 2004, p. 124, Báez, Los 
negocios fiduciarios en la imposición  sobre la Renta (2009), p. 191.
18  This approach will be analyzed in paragraph 3.
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to “secondary facts”). They have been defined as “facts” established by the rules of private law or other 
non-tax fields of law, for instance, how a contract should be interpreted, whether an exchange of letters 
amounts to a contract, or whether a payment from a company to a shareholder should be considered as a 
salary, loan, dividend or capital gain19. This alternative factual approach is in our opinion a sort of con-
ceptual hocus-pocus. If we say that “legal facts” are the legal acts actually performed20, it seems obvious 
that we are making reference to facts that have been characterized according to a specific previously 
interpreted applicable rule. In short “legal facts” are not facts but actually the result of the application 
of a construed law. To name an example, if we consider that a sale and lease-back agreement does not 
amount to a sale this does not imply a simple assessment of the facts, but really the result of a certain 
interpretation of the legal concept of sale. Definitively, this second variant of the “factual approach” 
is just a transvestited version of a simple interpretative approach which will be analyzed in following 
paragraphs21.
11. So, if all this is true, why then such an insistence on a factual approach? Hence we come, to 
the core of this position. It has been said that whether the factual or interpretative approach is used, de-
pends on a choice of perspective rather than on inherent differences in the rules as such and, therefore, 
it does not seem logical to attach serious legal consequences to the choice of approach22. One might 
share this opinion only by assuming, as a given, that internal GAARs might be applied in a tax treaty 
context. Nevertheless, such a reasoning may be circular when it comes precisely to deciding whether or 
not GAARs conflict with double taxation conventions. This issue will be considered further ahead in the 
text. At this moment we just want to emphasize that the factual approach in either of its versions is just 
aimed to avoid conflicts between GAARs and double taxation conventions. Indeed, if the tax authorities 
or the Courts applying a GAAR merely determine the facts to which a conventional rule will be either 
applied or not applied, no conflicts will arise with double taxation conventions. The very statements of 
the OECD Commentary make its aim quite clear: “…to the extent these anti-avoidance rules are part of 
the basic domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which facts give rise to a tax liability, 
they are not addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by them. Thus, as a general rule, 
there will be no conflict between such rules and the provisions of tax conventions”23. In fact, one might 
say that factual approaches have been always, in this and other contexts, just a goal oriented reasoning 
aimed at avoiding  different problems that might result from a mere interpretative approach.
12. Nevertheless the above described inconsistencies are not the main problem to which a factual 
approach might lead in this context. As we will try to demonstrate in the following paragraph the OECD 
reasoning might give rise to a serious -and dangerous- misleading effect.
3. Factual approach and widening of the concept of sham: a risk in certain jurisdictions
13. The borderline between sham and avoidance has never been an easy task24. In fact the delicate 
distinction between both concepts seems to have been perceived for ages25 and has provoked, in certain 
19  ziMMer, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, 2005, p. 25. In the same direction but less clear-
ly: ziMMer, “General Report”, in Form and Substance in Tax Law (2002), p. 28-29.
20  As stated for example in: ziMMer, General Report, in Form and Substance in Tax Law, p. 29.
21  We think this is exactly the conclusion of Prof. ziMMer when he states: “Thus, the factual approach em-
bedded in the OECD Commentaries implies legal (including tax law) considerations, as does the interpretative 
approach” (ziMMer, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, 2005, p. 25-26).
22  ziMMer, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, 2005, p. 25.
23  OECD Commentaries on Art. 1 § 9.2.
24  As ziMMer states: “…in countries which have anti-avoidance rules, the borderline between sham/simula-
tion and avoidance may be blurred” (ziMMer, “General Report”, in Form and Substance in Tax Law, p. 31).
25  Medieval scholars (Baldus) already stated tot modis committitur simulatio quot modis comittitur fraus 
(sham is performed in the same way as avoidance). As quoted by: „Coing, Simulatio und Fraus in der Lehre des 
Bartolus und Baldus“, in Festschrift für Paul Koschaker, Vol. 3 (1939), p. 402.
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jurisdictions, a gradual approach (confusion) of both instruments26. This rapprochement, as for countries 
which have anti-avoidance rules, makes sense as a proposal de lege ferenda, but leaves the problem 
unresolved especially for those regulations in which sham transactions and GAARs have different pro-
cedural requirements and legal consequences. On the other hand, we think there is a possible criterion in 
order to make a distinction between sham and abusive transactions. In our opinion the whole confusion 
is originated by the very classical criterion used in order to portray the concept of sham requiring that the 
transaction be conducted with an element of deceit, an element which in turn would be absent in abusive 
transactions. The fact is, and this has been frequently stressed by scholars, that abusive transactions in-
corporate a certain element of deceit as well27, which might be identified with the element of artificiality 
inherent in abusive transactions. In a nutshell, under this approach there is no way sham and avoidance 
could be distinguished. In our opinion, even if both, simulation and avoidance, share a fake element this 
refers to different objects28. In sham transactions tax payers lie on what has been labelled as “pure or real 
facts29” (was the price actually paid?; did that person really take part in that meeting?). In turn, in abusive 
transactions, tax payers do not hide real facts – actually they pretend their legal consequences- but the 
purpose of the transactions they have conducted30. 
14. Once we have proved the existence of a real –and justifiable- borderline between sham and 
abusive transactions, we are in a position to analyze how the factual approach, as proposed by the OECD 
Commentaries, might cause confusion in relation to the above mentioned distinction. As we saw before, 
the factual approach –or at least one of its versions- is based upon the assumption that, in certain circum-
stances, the “legal facts”, as assessed by tax payers, might be correctly characterized by tax authorities 
(or Courts) in order to take into account the “real legal facts”. This process can be illustrated resorting 
to an easy dividend-stripping transaction. The legal facts as presented by the tax payers (a capital gain) 
might be replaced by the tax authorities with the “real legal facts” they assume to have taken place (a 
dividend). As described by ziMMer, according to the factual approach, even if the legal form is a gain “in 
fact” the payment is a dividend for tax purposes31. Even if it is evident that in this kind of transactions 
there is no deceit in relation to real or pure facts, certain countries might succumb to temptation and 
make use of the shamed transaction doctrines or rules in order to correct these situations.
15. This confusion has been reported in relation to States that lack GAARs32. But this mistake is 
26  This trend has been described by several scholars all around the World. As for Spain: Báez, Los negocios 
fiduciarios en la imposición sobre la Renta, p. 204 et seq, in relation to fiduciary structures; Ruiz, El fraude a la ley 
tributaria a examen (2006), p. 114 et seq. In the UK: Ballard;	davison, United Kingdom, in Form and Substance 
in Tax Law (2002), p. 569 (p. 572), describing the existence of certain hints in several cases that sham may have a 
wider meaning than that referring to simple factual deceit. In the US: strenG;	yoder, United States, in Form and 
Substance in Tax Law (2002), p. 595 (p. 596) referring to the confusing “economic sham doctrine”.  
27  This idea has been frequently stressed by Spanish scholars when dealing with the penalisation of tax 
avoidance strategies: palao	taBoada, Los instrumentos normativos contra la elusión fiscal, en La justicia en el 
diseño y aplicación de los tributos (2005), p. 111 (p. 120 et seq). alonso	MadriGal;	GóMez-lanz, “Fraude a la ley 
tributaria, ilícito e infracción tributaria y delito de defraudación”, Estudios Financieros. Revista de contabilidad y 
tributación, Nº 281-282, 2006, p. 3 (p. 41).  ruiz, El fraude a la ley tributaria a examen, p. 115.
28  We cannot share therefore the opinion, as stated by ruiz	alMendral, that sham and avoidance share the 
same nature, differing only in the degree of bluntness or sophistication that the avoidance transaction has been 
dressed up with (ruiz-alMendral, “Tax Avoidance and the European Court of Justice:What is at Stake for Euro-
pean General Anti-Avoidance Rules”, Intertax, Vol. 33, Nº 12, 2005, p. 562 (p. 564).
29  Using the words of: ziMMer, “General Report”, in Form and Substance in Tax Law, p. 19 (p. 28). ziMMer, 
Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2005, p. 25.
30  This question really surpasses the scope of this article. For an in depth analysis see: Báez, Los negocios 
fiduciarios en la imposición sobre la Renta, p. 205 et seq.
31  ziMMer, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2005, p. 26.
32  This is the case in Colombia and Mexico. If we analyze the arguments exposed by Colombian and Mexican 
reporters in the 56th Congress of the IFA in order to consider a dividend-stripping as a case of sham we will con-
clude that they are totally in line with a sort of factual approach as it is defended by the OECD Commentaries. As 
for the Colombian Report it is stated that: “…once the tax office is able to cut through this apparent legal reality the 
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also present even in those countries, like Spain, which have a GAAR (Art. 15 of the Spanish Ley General 
Tributaria). In order to expose an example in line with the reflections of the 56th Congress of the IFA, let 
us describe the position of the Spanish Tax Administration in relation to international dividend-stripping 
cases in which a double taxation convention was applicable33. In a typical dividend-stripping set of trans-
actions34, the Spanish Tribunal Económico Administrativo Central35 stated that “...in fact we are in front 
of a set of purchase agreements which constitute the sham transactions that hide the real transaction re-
ally performed, a payment of dividends. [...] Therefore we should tax the real taxable event performed 
by the tax payer, regardless what legal form they have used. […] If what we really have is a mere power 
of attorney the only income to be taxed would be the commission paid by the grantor to the grantee”36. 
16. One might check easily that all these reflections are totally in line with a factual approach as it 
is exposed by the OECD Commentaries. Actually, the factual approach, even if not intended in that way, 
might encourage a total confusion between sham and abusive transactions even in those countries, like 
Spain, which have a GAAR. Therefore, in order to properly analyze the relationship between domestic 
GAARs and double taxation conventions, one should depart from a strict interpretative (applicative) 
approach as will be exposed in the following paragraphs.
III. Legal approach to GAAR’s. The need to add nuances
17. The preceding reflections clearly show that GAARs must be considered as instruments which 
embody a process of legal application as the very consequence of tax avoidance. As clear as this may 
be in the theory, the question remains of exactly what can be considered application in the context of 
GAARs. The problem emerges due to the fact that there are different views regarding the very nature of 
legal application.
18. It is a widespread position, among scholars, that domestic anti-avoidance rules and judicial 
anti-avoidance doctrines are interpretative principles under which tax law applies only to transactions 
with economic or commercial substance; therefore tax legislation is interpreted not to apply to tran-
sactions that lack economic substance or business purpose. Keeping with this idea, there would be no 
conflict between tax treaties and domestic GAARs37. 
19. This is also the position assumed by the OECD Commentaries when referring to States that 
truth surfaces, that the transaction lacks real economic substance (and so is not a real economic tax event), which 
takes us into the sphere of tax evasion” (paniaGua-lozano;	MayorGa-aranGo, Colombia in Form and Substance 
in Tax Law (2002), p. 213 (p. 220). As for the Mexican Report: “If the judge decides that the act is simulated, it 
would probably be determined that what the parties really agreed to was that C (Company which pays the divi-
dends) would pay dividends to A (original holder of shares) and A would pay to B (Company purchasing the shares 
according to the dividend-stripping transaction) a certain amount of money” (Moreno	GóMez	de	parada, Mexico, 
in Form and Substance in Tax Law (2002), p. 429 (p. 434).
33  Nevertheless there are further examples of this position, even assumed by the Courts both administrative 
and criminal, which cannot be reported in this article.
34  A company, resident in the UK, sells to another company, resident in Spain, shares which in turn have 
been issued by a third company also resident in Spain, days before the dividends are paid. After the payment of 
the dividend the UK Company purchases the shares according to reciprocal call and put options previously agreed 
obtaining a gain equivalent to the dividend minus an amount which is actually the commission received by the 
second Spanish Company.
35  TEAC 15 June 2006, (JT 2006, 1421).
36  There are also other rulings in this same line: TEAC 16 September 2005 (JT 2006, 85) and TEAC 2 Febru-
ary 2006 (JUR 2006, 157322)
37  Martín	JiMénez,  Bulletin  for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 19. sasseville, “Tax Avoidance 
involving Tax Treaties”, in Jirousek/lanG (eds.) Praxis des Internationalen Steuerrechts, p. 459. Arnold,  Bulletin 
for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 251. de	Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of 
Abuse,  p. 387, implicitly when analyzing the distinction between States that consider an abuse of a tax treaty as 
an abuse of domestic law and those  that consider an abuse of a treaty as being independent. 
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label abuses as being abuses of the convention itself, and concluding that these States consider that a 
proper construction of tax conventions (resulting from their object and purpose) allows them to disre-
gard abusive transactions38. This position closes the circle of the new OECD approach in relation to 
domestic GAARs and double taxation conventions: the factual approach is the solution as for States 
which consider that an abuse of a tax treaty is also an abuse of domestic law; in turn, the interpretative 
approach saves the application of domestic GAARs in States that label abuses as being abuses of the 
convention itself.
20. Apart from the fact that the distinction upon which the OECD position is based has been 
reasonably considered artificial and unjustified39, the interpretive approach, as described above, merits 
criticism. These reflections manage a far reaching and confusing concept of interpretation which is not 
unknown to the European legal tradition. In order to clarify this point we will first focus on the very con-
cept of interpretation especially by stating its limits. After this, we will try to extract the consequences 
for the issue under scrutiny in this article.
1. Nature and limits of interpretation.
21. The identification of GAARs with interpretative techniques departs from a wide-reaching 
concept of interpretation that makes it equal to the application of rules in general. This assimilation 
between GAARs and interpretative methods is evident in certain scholars dealing with the special pro-
blematic of this article. 
22. Let us take the opinion from Martín Jiménez who, in an article previous to the 2003 version of 
the OECD Commentaries, stated: “The current situation of domestic anti-abuse measures in a tax treaty 
context may be affected by a misunderstanding on the part of the OECD. It has been shown that the 
rigid application of the pacta sunt servanda principle, is not justified from the international law point of 
view. […] Thus, it seems that the OECD’s starting point in 1977 generated a fake debate: from the point 
of view of international law, the obligations stemming from a treaty are not those derived from a literal 
wording of the treaty, but the obligations derived after a process in which the principle of good faith and 
a teleological interpretation are critical40.
23. Nevertheless, this position is neither new nor especially focused on the relationship between 
GAARs and double taxation conventions. In fact, this particular understanding of GAARs is as old as 
GAARs themselves41, and is frequently used by German and Austrian scholars in order to deny these 
rules an own normative meaning being their nature a mere statement of the necessity of an interpretation 
according to the purpose of the avoided or caught provision42.
38  OECD Commentaries on Art. 1 § 9.3.
39  de	Broe,  International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 387.
40  Martín	JiMénez, “Domestic Anti-Abuse Rules and Double Taxation Treaties: a Spanish Perspective – Part 
I”., Bulletin  for International Fiscal Documentation, November 2002, p. 542 (p. 550). This same idea is repeated 
in later articles with different words: “…general domestic anti-abuse rules do not extend the taxable event by add-
ing to it certain conduct where an elusive element is presumed or conduct that is economically equivalent to that 
defined in the taxable event” (Martín	JiMénez,  Bulletin  for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 19).  
41  As far as we know, in relation to tax matters, this debate started with the introduction of a GAAR in § 5 
of the German Reichsabgabenordnung (1919). Many German authors from the 20’s and 30’s considered a GAAR 
unnecessary, for it was enough a simple interpretation of the avoided provisions: Ball, Steuerrecht und Privatrecht 
(1924), p. 130-132; 142-147; Becker, Die Reichabgabenordnung. 7th ed. (1930), p. 109-113. 
42  This idea has generated an important dispute in Germany between those who are in favor of the, so called, 
Innentheorie and those who advocate the Auβentheorie. As for Germany see: tipke, Die Steuerrechtsordnung. 
Band III: Föderative Steuerverteilung, Rechtsanwendung und Rechtschutz, Gestalter der Steuerrechtsordnung 
(1993) p. 1286 et seq. See, in relation to Austrian legal doctrine: Hohenwarter, Austria, in Maisto (ed.) Tax Treaties 
and Domestic Law (2006) p.161 (p. 195-196).
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24. The mere assimilation of GAARs and interpretation techniques generates severe inconsis-
tencies whose detailed analysis would considerably surpass the scope of this contribution. Notwiths-
tanding we should emphasize that, one the one hand, the above described position might generate 
certain doubts as to when using mere interpretative techniques and when resorting to GAARs43. On 
the other hand, and this is in our opinion the main point at stake, this simple assimilation creates 
serious doubts on the very limits of the interpretation process. This last reflection can be illustrated, 
for the purposes of this article, with the following statements of De Broe: “The result of the recha-
racterization or redetermination in which domestic anti-avoidance provisions often result can only be 
given effect for treaty purposes if that result is supported by the text of the tax treaty, construed in its 
context and light of its object and purpose”44. The question raises immediately: if the result of the re-
characterization or redetermination is supported by the text of the treaty, why is it necessary the resort 
to GAARs? Why are the general interpretation techniques not enough for the purposes of combating 
tax avoidance? In our opinion, these questions might not be answered without a solid basis on the 
nature and limits of interpretation.
25. In our opinion the whole confusion on this issue is generated by the traditional interpretative 
criteria which have been accepted worldwide. The core of the problem is the distinction between literal 
and teleological interpretation in relation to the same provision and leading to different results45. The 
solution for this conceptual question might be found in the law theory46. 
26. The wording of a legal provision might be polysemous in those cases in which it can be at-
tributed different meanings. Interpreting a provision, or the term contained in a legal provision, implies 
the selection of one of its possible meanings according to several criteria among which the purpose of 
the interpreted rule might be considered crucial47. In this context, it is far from clear what does “written 
law”, “wording” or “literal interpretation” mean. The text of a provision is just the starting point for its 
interpretation and, at the same time, the limit for this process as the interpreter cannot go beyond the 
possible sense(s) of those words (Wortsinn in German legal theory48). Thus, every interpretation must 
be literal as it departs, when determining the possible sense of the words, from written law. At the same 
43  And this might be a problem for those countries in which the legal consequences of the different applicative 
techniques may considerably diverge.
44  de	Broe,  International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 387.
45  This distinction might be found when dealing with GAARs as a general issue. Especially in relation to 
GAARs and double taxation conventions in: Martín	JiMénez, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 
2002, p. 550: “The rules of interpretation […] in Arts. 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
[…] do not proclaim a literal interpretation as the main rule. Thus, a real interpretation of a treaty is needed which 
takes into account its purpose”; veGa	BorreGo, Las medidas contra el treaty shopping (2003) p. 101: “…the goal 
of these rules –referring to GAARs- is to restrict a formalist interpretation which primes the text over the purpose 
favoring avoidance”. Goyette, Canadian Tax Journal, 2003, p. 769: “Paragraphs 9.3 and 9.5 of the commentary 
evidence a desire to go beyond  the mere letter of treaties and  to consider their object and purpose”; following 
AG tesauro, sasseville, “A Tax Treaty Perspective: Special Issues”, in Maisto (ed.) Tax Treaties and Domestic 
Law, p. 60: “Such a rule, conceived as a principle of interpretation, constitutes an indispensable safety-valve for 
protecting the aims of all provisions of Community law against a formalistic application of them based solely on 
their plaing meaning”; de	Broe,  International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 245: “Such interpreta-
tion may require that a purely literal interpretation is abandoned if such interpretation would do harm to the parties’ 
common intentions and expectations and/or the treaty’s object and  purpose”. 
46  In this contribution we depart from the classical view of larenz (larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswis-
senschaft (1969), p. 342) which has been assumed by German scholars and case law. See: Báez, Los negocios 
fiduciarios en la imposición sobre la Renta, p. 31.
47  As stated by lanG and heidenBauer: “… the wording of a provision, if analysed carefully enough, usu-
ally leaves much room for heterogeneous results of interpretation. Taking into account the object and purpose 
of a provision, together with other means of interpretation, leads to a limitation of the number of possible 
different meanings” (lanG;	heidenBauer, “Wholly Artificial Arrangements”, in (hinnekens; Hinnekens eds.) 
A vision of Taxes within and outside European Borders. Festschrift in honor of Prof. Dr. Frans Vanistendael 
(2008), p. 597 (p. 609).
48  As opposed to the words of a provision designated so as to Wortlaut.
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time every interpretation that pretends to be correct, must be teleological, if we take into account that the 
selection of the proper meaning must be guided and rational, and that rules must be considered as instru-
ments to achieve certain goals. If all this is true, it seems evident that considering GAARs as a mean to 
go beyond the letter of a tax statute implies a logical contradiction. 
27. In this context, the limits of interpretation must be defined according to the possibility of at-
tributing different meanings to a single legal term. This might not be an easy task in those cases in which 
private law concepts are used in tax statutes, either by a simple or explicit remission. Even if legal theory 
states that the same term contained in different rules might be understood differently by following their 
respective legal purposes49, the practice in several countries shows a broad range of approaches in rela-
tion to this problem50. By contrast, as it has been stated, even in jurisdictions with a strict adherence to 
private law concepts in tax law, there may be concepts in tax statutes that do not correspond to private 
law concepts or where the legislator has made it clear that the concept should have a different content 
from private law relations51. In these cases the private law meaning is not binding and the possibility of 
defining several possible senses, from a strict tax law perspective, is certainly easier.
28. In short, when tax statutes make use of private law concepts it seems difficult to face tax avoi-
dance by means of a simple interpretation of the avoided provision. In these cases it is necessary to go 
beyond the possible senses of the legal wording resorting to GAARs. Nevertheless, the problem might 
be different when tax laws contain autonomous concepts as we will try to show in the next paragraph.
2. Combating intended avoidance. The case of attribution
29. The above mentioned reasons justify that, in certain cases, tax payers intend the avoidance or 
capture of a tax statute (i.e. double taxation conventions) but this attempt might be faced with a simple 
construction of the avoided or unlawfully captured provision. As has been said, real avoidance starts 
exactly there where the art of interpretation starts to fail52. For the same reason, every intended avoi-
dance does not require the application of a GAAR. It is obvious that this way of facing pretended tax 
avoidance cannot affect the pacta sunt servanda principle. As Lowe pointed out, being true that a treaty 
must be honoured, this does not say anything about the content of the pact that must be respected. In 
short, for certain cases, a proper interpretation of domestic or conventional provisions, within the limits 
previously described, will be enough to counteract abusive transactions.
30. Scholars have pointed out several areas, in relation to treaty shopping, in which this way of 
thinking might bear fruits53. Nevertheless a comprehensive analysis of these areas surpasses the scope of 
this article and therefore we will merely focus on one of these issues, namely the attribution of income 
to tax payers. An artificial use of the legal rules and principles that guide the attribution of income to tax 
payers is behind an important amount of abusive transactions in general and treaty-shopping structures 
49  This is in fact an old idea frequently named as “legal concept’s relativity”. See: enGisch, Die Einheit der 
Rechtsordnung. Unveränd. reprograf. Nachdr. d. 1935 (1987) p 45.
50  In relation to this see: ziMMer, “General Report”, in Form and Substance in Tax Law, p. 25 et seq.
51  ziMMer, General Report, in Form and Substance in Tax Law, p. 27.
52  hensel, “Zur Dogmatik des Begriffs “Steuerumgehung””, in Bonner Festgabe für Ernst Zittelmann 
zum fünfzigjährigen Doktorjubiläum, (1923), p. 244. Also, in recent publications as for The Netherlands: van	
wheeGel, The Improper use of Tax Treaties. With Particular Reference to the Netherlands and the United States 
(1998), p. 165.
53  hohenwarter, Austria, in Maisto	(ed.) Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, p. 206, making special references 
to the very concept of residence in relation to holding companies set up in low-tax jurisdictions. In a similar way, 
in relation to the corporate residence concept: looMer, “Tax Treaty Abuse: is Canada responding effectively?”, 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Papers, WP 09/05.
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in particular54 and this justifies our intention to shed certain light on it55.
31. Being treaty shopping, briefly described, the situation in which a person resident of a given 
state who is not entitled to the benefits of a tax treaty sets up an entity in another State in order to obtain 
those treaty benefits that are not directly available to him56, it seems obvious that this kind of strategies 
are conducted through a particular configuration of the criteria normally used so as to attribute income 
to tax-payers. This assertion might be illustrated with a well-known example of the Spanish practice.
32. In the early 90s several sportsmen resident in Spain transferred their appearance rights to non-
resident companies which in turn assigned these rights to the entity for which the sportsmen rendered 
their personal services (also resident in Spain). It goes without saying that this peculiar structure was 
designed in order to achieve several tax advantages (reduction of withholding taxes, tax deferral, avoi-
dance of personal income tax…). Regardless of the solutions that the Spanish Tax Administration and 
Tax Courts have given for these transactions, one might bear in mind that this example clearly shows 
how ordinary attribution criteria are managed by the tax payers in order to obtain tax savings. An income 
which would be normally attributed to a sportsman, performing personal services, is deviated to a non-
resident legal entity in order to obtain tax advantages.
33. In the presence of this kind of constructions the resort to GAARs seems a temptation difficult 
to resist. Nevertheless, this kind of transactions might be faced with different instruments that would be 
less problematic from the point of view of the rule of law and, summing up, of the pacta sunt servanda 
principle. This mechanism is nothing other than that of interpreting the rules under which the attribution 
of income is governed by in the source State taken that, as a general rule, attribution issues are not dealt 
with in double taxation conventions57.
34. In this context one should depart from a particular analysis of attribution rules. It has been 
said that according to prevailing opinion, income is attributable to the person that disposes of the source 
of income and the resulting benefits inter partes, i.e. the person that has the possibility of using market 
opportunities or withholding performances58. These considerations may, but need not always, be valid. 
As mentioned above, a solution that relies upon attribution rules might depart from the very analysis of 
that rules, bearing in mind that attribution of income might be designed on the basis of legal or economic 
entitlement59. According to this, we should refuse “standardized solutions” and resolve the sportsmen 
case taking account of the Spanish general attribution rules.
35. When referring to attribution issues, Spain might not be easily classified neither as a legal nor 
54  On the importance of attribution criteria in the tax avoidance field: Báez, Los negocios fiduciarios en la 
imposición sobre la Renta, p. 56 et seq. with an analysis of the German bibliography and case law on this particular 
issue.
55  This does not mean that the reflections and procedures described hereinafter might not be useful for 
other areas.
56  As described in: de	Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 5.
57  An exceptional position in relation to this issue might be found in Henkel for whom attribution is ef-
fectively ruled in double taxation conventions because, otherwise, their rules would be incomplete. (henkel, in 
Mössner (ed.) Steuerrecht international tätiger Unternehmen (1998), Rdn. E 491. Nevertheless it has been stated 
that in many countries treaties do not generally give any guidance on how the connection between income and a 
person is to be made for treaty purposes (wheeler, “General Report”, in Conflicts in the attribution of income to a 
person (2007), p. 17 (p.22). In the same direction Lang states: “…tax treaties do not take any independent attribu-
tion decisions. […] Tax treaties are hence based on the domestic attribution decision” (lanG, “CFC Regulations 
and Double Taxation Treaties”, Bulletin  for International Fiscal Documentation 2003, p. 51 (p. 54).
58  hohenwarter, Austria, in Maisto (ed.) Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, p. 207.
59  In relation to this issue: wheeler, “General Report”, in Conflicts in the attribution of income to a person, p. 
20 et seq. In relation to Spain and considering fiduciary structures: Báez, Los negocios fiduciarios en la imposición 
sobre la Renta, p. 66 et seq.
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as an economic country60. The Spanish tax system contains different attribution criteria depending on the 
nature of the taxable person (natural or legal person) and the affected tax (personal income tax, corporate 
tax or withholding tax). Focusing on the sportsmen case one should consider the sportsman as a taxable 
person subject to personal income tax according to either legal (for capital income) or economic attribu-
tion criteria (for income from employment) and the non-resident company subject to withholding taxes 
according to economic criteria (on the basis of the autonomous concept of obtaining)61. An attribution 
of income to the sportsman on the basis of pure economic criteria (it is the sportsman who disposes of 
the source of income and the resulting benefits) might on occasion prove demanding especially if the in-
come resulting from the transfer of appearance rights is classified as capital income. Nevertheless, even 
in that case, there are good grounds for attributing the income to the sportsman: 1) There is a rather ge-
neral consensus on the very concept of obtaining62. 2) The attribution of the income to the non-resident 
company would be contrary to the economic criteria set up by the Withholding Tax Act63. 3) Last, but 
not least, if the attribution criteria are aimed at the taxation of income in the hands of the tax payer who 
actually shows ability to pay in relation to that income64, it seems logical to attribute the income to its 
“economic owner”, at least in those cases in which the interpretation of these criteria offer a wide range 
of possibilities (different meanings for a single legal wording).
36. Summing up, this attempt of avoidance might be faced with a simple construction of the avoi-
ded or unlawfully captured provision which, in this case, must be identified with the rules governing the 
attribution of income. 
37. In order to offer a comprehensive picture of this issue, there are still two further questions 
which might be taken into account:
38. a) As already mentioned, the OECD Commentaries clarify that it should be not lightly as-
sumed that a tax payer is entering into abusive transactions, and therefore provides a –so called- guiding 
principle. The technical elements of this guiding principle will be analyzed in further paragraphs of this 
contribution. At this moment we will focus only on a very special issue in relation to the interpretative 
solution previously described. The guiding principle is exposed and designed as a limit to the applica-
tion of domestic GAARs in a tax treaty context. What about cases, like those already exposed, in which 
an avoidance attempt is faced by means of a proper interpretation of domestic rules? In our opinion it 
is evident that these cases are beyond the scope of the guiding principle65. There are two reasons which 
60  Even if we consider that this classification is rather simplistic as the so called “economic criteria” are also 
“legal criteria” as they are reflected in legal (tax) rules. 
61  For these rules in detail: Báez, Los negocios fiduciarios en la imposición sobre la Renta, p. 66 et seq.
62  Started in Germany and Austria in the late 70s (ruppe. “Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Übertragung von 
Einkunftsquellen als Problem der Zurechnung von Einkünften”, in tipke (ed.) Übertragung von Einkunftsquellen 
im Steuerrecht (1978), p. 7-40) and recently used in Spain in relation to fiduciary structures (Báez, Los negocios 
fiduciarios en la imposición sobre la Renta, p. 161 et seq) or even to the transfer of appearance rights (ortiz, Las 
rentas derivadas de la cesión de derechos de imagen de los deportistas profesionales: su discutida calificación 
Jurídico-Tributaria, Revista Aranzadi de Derecho de Deporte y Entretenimiento 2009, p. 113 (p. 124 et seq.). Even 
the US Tax Court has made use of a similar reasoning helding that interest payments made from a US corporation 
to a related Honduras corporation, where an equivalent amount of  interest was paid onward to a related Bahamas 
corporation were actually “paid” to the Honduran entity ((1971) 56 TC 925 (USTC) as quoted by looMer, “Tax 
Treaty Abuse: is Canada responding effectively?”, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Pa-
pers 2009, no page indication). It is of the most importance that the court considered that the Honduran entity did 
not have complete dominion and control over the funds, a similar reasoning to the concepts frequently used by 
European scholars and Courts in relation to the concept of income obtaining.
63  Article 12 of the Texto Refundido de la Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta de los no Residentes.
64  This idea is to be found in European scholars with different legal traditions: Jarach. El hecho imponible: 
teoría general del derecho tributario sustantivo. 3rd. Edition (1996), p. 168. tipke, Die Steuerrechtsordnung. Band 
III: Föderative Steuerverteilung, Rechtsanwendung und Rechtschutz, Gestalter der Steuerrechtsordnung (1993) p. 
1353. Báez, Los negocios fiduciarios en la imposición sobre la Renta, p. 135.
65  A different opinion in a similar case (rather ambiguous): Garcia-prats, “La interpretación jurisprudencial 
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might justify this statement: 1) The guiding principle, as formulated by the OECD Commentaries, is 
applicable to anti-avoidance rules. It seems evident that the mere interpretation of a domestic attribu-
tion rule cannot be included under that category. It must be taken into account that even the beneficial 
owner requirement in Arts. 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD Model –whose resemblance with income attribu-
tion criteria seems evident- have been reputed fundamental rules of taxation rather than anti-avoidance 
rules66. 2) Were the guiding principle also applicable to interpretations followed to counteract avoidance 
attempts, it would not affect interpretations as those exposed above. It should be taken into account that 
corrections of attribution based upon the interpretation guidelines previously described, exclude the 
very application of the potentially concerned double taxation convention (i.e. the income is attributed to 
the resident sportsman as if paid directly by the resident corporation). Thus, it is evident that once the 
application of the double taxation convention has been excluded, the reflections of the OECD Commen-
taries do not play any role, as the problem turns into a pure domestic situation.
39. Nevertheless, this discussion might turn out to be unsignificant in the practice. As stated be-
fore, the application of the concept of income-obtaining requires the identification of the person that has 
the possibility of using market opportunities or withholding performances in relation to the income. If 
this person is correctly identified, and the treaty shopper is regarded for tax purposes, this identification 
will be normally in line with the general criteria set-up by the guiding principle which will be consid-
ered in detail in subsequent paragraphs. The Prévost Car case might be an example of what has been 
previously exposed even if it considers the concept of beneficial ownership67. In this case the Canada 
Tax Court rejected a possible disregard of the treaty shopper (resident in the Netherlands) as there was 
no predetermined or automatic flow of funds to its shareholders (resident in the UK and Sweden) and 
theoretical beneficial owners68. In short, the concept of income-obtaining if properly applied excludes 
the possibility of disregarding a non artificial transaction.
40. b) The above mentioned cases implied a correction of avoidance attempts in mere treaty shop-
ping cases; as stated before a proper construction of the obtaining concept excluded the very application 
of the potentially concerned double taxation convention. Nevertheless this interpretative approach might 
find further problems if applied to rule-shopping cases (i.e. improper use which affect objective rules 
of tax treaties as for example conversion of dividends into capital gains). In these cases even if a proper 
understanding of the attribution criteria might correct the tax avoidance strategy, the tax treaty is still 
applicable but making use of a different distributive rule (e.g. dividends instead of capital gains rules). 
The previously defended idea regarding that certain avoidance attempts might be faced with a simple 
construction of the avoided or unlawfully captured provision, seems too simple for these cases, taking 
into account that the double taxation convention is to be applied but using a different qualification of 
the income69. In short this is not a mere interpretation of attribution rules but requires additionally an 
application of the treaty rules which might go beyond the possible sense(s) of its words. All this might 
be illustrated with a simple dividend-stripping example.
41. A, resident in the State A, owns shares of the Company B, resident in the State B. A can sell the 
shares free from capital gains tax and it sells the shares to C, resident in the State B, some days before 
the distribution of dividends. Just after the distribution of dividends, A buys the shares back for a price 
set in advance which takes into account the value of the distributed dividend70.
como mecanismo para hacer frente a la elusión tributaria”, Tribunal Fiscal, nº220, 2009, p. 22 (p. 35)
66  arnold,  Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 248.
67  It is worth stating though the strong resemblance between the income-obtaining and the beneficial owner-
ship concepts: Hohenwarter, Austria, in Maisto	(ed.) Tax Treaties and Domestic Law, p. 207.
68  looMer, “Tax Treaty Abuse: is Canada responding effectively?”, Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation, Working Papers 2009, no page indication).
69  For that reason the general approach to improper use of tax treaties, valid both for treaty and rule shopping, 
demanded by Martín	JiMénez (Martín	JiMénez, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2002, p. 549-550) 
need not always be valid.
70  This is the basic dividend-stripping scheme which of course might be conducted by means of more com-
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42. It has been defended that this kind of constructions could be faced by means of a proper 
construction of attribution rules as it seems evident that the income is obtained, as far as market oppor-
tunities or withholding performances are concerned, by the original owner of the shares. The dividends 
should be attributed therefore to A, resident in the State A, and not to B71. Nevertheless rule-shopping 
strategies require a further step if we take into account that the proper solution implies not only attribut-
ing the income to a person different from that originally pretended by the tax payers, but also a different 
qualification of the attributed income (capital gains qualified for tax purposes as dividends). 
43. In our opinion, even in rule shopping cases, like dividend-stripping, a mere interpretation of 
attribution criteria would be enough to counteract avoidance attempts. In short, as in pure treaty shop-
ping cases, there is no need to resort to GAARS. This statement requires an explanation. 
44. Even if it seems that a (re) qualification from capital gain to dividend requires going beyond the 
possible sense(s) of the very legal terms “dividend” and “capital gain”, one should bear in mind the content 
of article 10(3) of the OECD Model Tax Convention: “The term “dividends” as used in this Article means in-
come from shares,“jouissance” shares or “jouissance” rights, mining shares, founders’ shares or other rights, 
not being debt-claims, participating in profits, as well as income from other corporate rights which is sub-
jected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares by the laws of the State of which the company 
making the distribution is a resident”. Even if the debate over the correct meaning of the bold text is still 
open72, it is also true that the OECD Commentaries have stressed: “Article 10 deals not only with dividends 
as such but also with interest on loans insofar as the lender effectively shares the risks run by the company, 
i.e. when repayment depends largely on the success or otherwise of the enterprise’s business. Articles 10 and 
11 do not therefore prevent the treatment of this type of interest as dividends under the national rules on thin 
capitalisation applied in the borrower’s country”. Therefore sharing the risk might also justify a qualification 
as dividend without going beyond possible sense(s) of the very legal terms of article 10 (3) of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention. In this context one should bear in mind the special circumstances of a dividend-
stripping case as described above. Even if the original holder does not receive dividends in a formal sense, it 
seems evident that it shares (or at least has shared) the risk run by the company and, in fact, this might be the 
reason, under the attribution rules previously described, for attributing the income to the original holder and 
not to the formal recipient of the dividends.This means that paragraph 3 of article 10 is not just a renvoi to 
domestic law originated by the remaining dissimilarities between Member countries in the field of company 
law and taxation law as regards the concept of dividend. Even a domestic treatment as dividends based upon 
a special anti avoidance rule, a GAAR or even a mere interpretation of attribution rules fit in with article 10(3) 
of of the OECD Model Tax Convention73.  
plex structures specially with regard to the transaction used for (re) purchasing  the shares. 
71  In relation to a similar case with (re)purchase making use of reciprocal put and call options: Báez, Los 
negocios fiduciarios en la imposición sobre la Renta, p. 156 et seq.
72  avery	Jones (et al.), “The Definitions of Dividends and Interests in the OECD Model: Something Lost in 
Traslation?”, British Tax Review, Nº 4, 2009, p. 406 (p. 422 et seq.).
73  As stated by de	Broe	(de	Broe,  International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 486) Courts 
in Canada have included the result of similar recharacterization under their domestic anti-avoidance rules within 
Art. 10 of the relevant treaties and the application of Dutch and US anti-avoidance doctrines in a domestic context 
also leads to a characterization as a dividend. Nevertheless these cases merit further discussion as far as Canada 
frequently deviates from the OECD definition of dividends. In relation to this Li and Sandler have indicated: “If 
the Canadian treaty definition of “dividends” is used in a particular treaty, a deemed dividend under section 212.1 
is clearly a “dividend” for treaty purposes even if the treaty was concluded before the introduction of section 212.1. 
Therefore, there is no conflict between section 212.1 and the dividend article of most of Canada’s tax treaties. If, 
however, the OECD definition of “dividends” is included in a particular treaty, it is arguable that a deemed divi-
dend under section 212.1 is not a “dividend” for treaty purposes because it is not “income from other corporate 
rights.” The definition of “dividends” in article 10(3) of the OECD model is exhaustive. Except to the extent spe-
cifically provided in that provision, reference to Canada’s domestic law is not permitted under either article 3(2) of 
the OECD model or section 3 of the ITCIA. In this situation, unless section 212.1 constitutes a treaty override, the 
provisions of the treaty are paramount and a provision based on article 13(4) of the OECD model, discussed be-
low, would exclude the gain from the sale of shares from tax in Canada” (li;	sandler, “The Relationship Between 
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3. Real avoidance cases.
45. When we face real avoidance cases –i.e. attempts which cannot be counteracted with a simple 
construction of the avoided or unlawfully captured provision- the question arises wether or not the ap-
plication of a domestic GAAR could be in breach of the pacta sunt servanda principle.
46. Apart from “limitation of benefits provisions” –which are kept out of this article- certain States 
have decided to expressly allow, in a tax treaty context, to apply domestic anti-avoidance rules. This is 
the case, for example, in several Canadian74, Belgian75 and Spanish76 Tax Treaties. With different nu-
ances the wording of these conventional rules provides as follows: “Nothing in the agreement shall be 
construed as preventing a Contracting State from denying benefits under the Agreement where it can 
reasonably be concluded that to do otherwise would result in an abuse of the provisions of the Agree-
ment or of the domestic laws of that State”77. Even if this kind of provisions have been severely criticized 
by scholars78, it is obvious that they allow going beyond the possible sense(s) of the Convention wording 
and, therefore, resolve an eventual breach of the pacta sunt servanda principle.
47. The situation turns problematic in those cases in which tax treaties keep silent on the applica-
tion of GAARs in the treaty context. But, even for these cases some jurisdictions, and a wide range of 
scholars79, take the view that a principle prohibiting treaty abuse is inherent in tax treaties. The existence 
of this principle is frequently linked to the general principles recognized by civilized nations according 
to article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Moreover, this seems to be also in line 
with the recent birth of a general principle of abuse of law in general Community Law80, and at least ina 
bilateral dimension, also the OECD Commentaries flirt with that idea81. The existence of this principle 
is an enormous topic in its own right that would require an in-depth analysis of the legality principle and 
sources of international public law82. According to the limited approach of this contribution we should 
focus, anyways, on the most practical issue at stake in relation to these cases.
48. Both conventional references to domestic GAARS and the implicit principle prohibiting trea-
ty abuse pose similar problems. They might generate diverging and contradictory results taking into 
Domestic Anti-Avoidance Legislation and Tax Treaties”, Canadian Tax Journal, Vol. 45, Nº 5, p. 891 (p. 935). 
74  Article 29(6) of the Canada-Germany Tax Treaty and article 29 A (7) of the Canada-US Tax Treaty (quoted 
by looMer, “Tax Treaty Abuse: is Canada responding effectively?”, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxa-
tion, Working Papers 2009, no page indication).
75  Tax Treaties with Germany, Luxembourg, Austria, Egypt and Hong-Kong (quoted by de	Broe,  Interna-
tional Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 461 et seq.).
76  Tax Treaty with Costa Rica.
77  For different models of this provision see: de	Broe,  International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse, 
p. 462 et seq.)
78  These provisions are considered to have been done less rigorously than special LOBs (looMer, “Tax 
Treaty Abuse: is Canada responding effectively?”, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Pa-
pers 2009, no page indication). These provisions have been also considered to promote legal uncertainty: hortalà	
i	vallvè, Comentarios a la Red Española de Convenios de Doble Imposición (2007), p. 48.
79  ward, Ward’s Tax Treaties 1996-1997 (1996), p. 61. voGel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions. 
3rd ed. (1997), p. 125. 
80  Even if that principle is a matter of discussion. Very critical against the existence of this principle: de	Broe, 
International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 828 et seq.
81  OECD Commentaries on Art. 1 § 7.1: “Taxpayers may be tempted to abuse the tax laws of a State by 
exploiting the differences between various countries’ laws. Such attempts may be countered by provisions or ju-
risprudential rules that are part of the domestic law of the State concerned. Such a State is then unlikely to agree 
to provisions of bilateral double taxation conventions that would have the effect of allowing abusive transactions 
that would otherwise be prevented by the provisions and rules of this kind contained in its domestic law. Also, it 
will not wish to apply its bilateral conventions in a way that would have that effect”.
82  A good overview of these problems in: paschen, Steuerumgenhung in nationalen und internationalen 
Steuerrecht (2001), p. 125 et seq.
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account the variety of anti-abuse rules worldwide. On the other hand, and this is specially applicable 
to the pretended existence of an implicit principle, the configuration and the conditions upon which 
the anti-avoidance rule might be applied remain totally open. This seems particularly worrying if the 
implicit international anti-abuse principle is merely identified with a substance over form-principle83, 
being substance over form a mere description of the result of the application of a GAAR which does not 
provide a single clue on the conditions of its application. 
49. In our opinion the core goal of the guiding principle designed by the OECD is facing the above 
mentioned problems84. In short, the real question at stake is not the possibility, in abstract terms, of going 
beyond the possible sense(s) of the Convention wording, but the conditions upon which this might be made. 
IV. The guiding principle. A critical analysis of its components according to legal theory and Eu-
ropean community law
50. As stated before, the OECD Commentaries have construed a guiding principle which consists of 
two components85.  One referred to the purpose of the transaction and another to the purpose of the avoided 
or caught treaty provision. Both components have to be analyzed carefully as they embody the core of the 
OECD’s position on the issue under scrutiny. The principle might also be of a high interest if we take into 
account that certain commentators have suggested that the two elements enshrined in the guiding principle 
can be also recognized in the emerging jurisprudence of the ECJ on the conditions under which a measure 
that hinders the basic freedoms of the Treaty could be justified on the basis of the prevention of tax avoi-
dance86. If this is true the guiding principle will provide Member States with a secure instrument to apply 
GAARs in a treaty context without compromising the basic European freedoms.
Both components must be analysed separately.
1. Main purpose of the transaction.
51. According to the first component of the guiding principle, the benefits of a convention should 
not be available where a main purpose for entering into certain transactions or arrangements was to secu-
re a more favourable tax position. This “main purpose requirement” has received much criticism among 
scholars specially focused on its wording (specially the reference to the “main” instead of the “sole” or the 
“principal” purpose of the transaction87) and its connection with certain examples introduced in the Com-
mentaries in order to illustrate this component88. In our opinion this first component is deeply rooted in 
the business purpose test doctrine which, notwithstanding its literal design (main/sole/principal purpose), 
has serious drawbacks as pre-requisite to decide whether or not a transaction is to be considered abusive.
83  As in the standard formula of voGel:voGel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions. 3rd ed. (1997), p. 125.
84  Also suggested by de	Broe:	de	Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 317.
85  There is a conceptual issue in relation to the guiding principle that merits certain attention. The question is 
weather the guiding principle constitutes an anti-abuse rule in its own right or merely establishes limits in relation 
to domestical GAARs. This might be important as for those States (like Spain) that require a special procedure in 
order to apply its domestical GAAR. Suggesting (not categorically) that the guiding principle is an anti-abuse rule: 
de	Broe:	de	Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 317-318. arnold is more emphatic 
stating that the guiding principle may be tantamount to establishing a treaty anti-avoidance rule (arnold, Bulletin 
for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 247).
86  sasseville, “Tax Avoidance involving Tax Treaties”, in Jirousek/Lang (eds.) Praxis des Internationalen 
Steuerrechts, p. 463.
87  de	Broe,  International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 319 et seq. 
88  Specially in relation to the case in which an individual who, essentially in order to sell the shares and es-
cape taxation in that State on the capital gains from the alienation (by virtue of paragraph 5 of Article 13), transfers 
his permanent home to the other Contracting State, where such gains are subject to little or no tax (OECD Com-
mentaries on Art. 1 § 9). Critical against the first component in relation to this example: Martín	JiMénez, Bulletin 
for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 19. de	Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of 
Abuse,  p. 321. 
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52. The resort to this particular anti-avoidance doctrine, whatever its formulation might be, may 
well lead to the exclusion of lawful tax planning transactions from treaty protection89. This does not 
mean that the lack of commercial or business purpose test in a transaction be totally irrelevant in order to 
conclude its abusive character. This lack might well be a sign of artificiality. The problem of the guiding 
principle, as we will see in the next paragraph, is that its second element has been designed without any 
reference to artifice and in a rather circular and self-referencial manner90. This might lead to characterize 
a transaction as abusive even in the absence of artifice.
53. This is also the key factor in order to decide weather or not the first component of the guiding 
principle is in line with the case law of the ECJ on tax avoidance. The existence of a wholly artificial 
arrangement has become a frequent requirement of the ECJ case law in tax avoidance cases. Apart from 
this reference, which is absent in the guiding principle, we must take into account several nuances, espe-
cially introduced in its ruling in Cadbury Schweppes, in which the European Court of Justice explicitly 
questions the business purpose test as a valid guide: “…in this case CS decided to establish CSTS and 
CSTI in the IFSC for the avowed purpose of benefiting from the favourable tax regime which that esta-
blishment enjoys does not in itself constitute abuse”91; “…the fact that none of the exceptions provided 
for by the legislation on CFCs applies and that the intention to obtain tax relief prompted the incorpo-
ration of the CFC and the conclusion of the transactions between the latter and the resident company 
does not suffice to conclude that there is a wholly artificial arrangement intended solely to escape that 
tax”92;  “In those circumstances, in order for the legislation on CFCs to comply with Community law, the 
taxation provided for by that legislation must be excluded where, despite the existence of tax motives, 
the incorporation of a CFC reflects economic reality”93. The conclusion is evident: an isolated94 business 
purpose test is not acceptable from a community law perspective. 
2. Tax treatment contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the treaty.
54. As stated before the OECD guiding principle incorporates a second element that relies on the 
fact that the obtaining of favourable treatment, previously described, would be contrary to the object and 
purpose of the relevant treaty provisions95. This second element is accompanied by an addition of a new 
objective to the traditional purpose of double taxation - to promote, by eliminating international double 
taxation, exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital and persons convention- which 
relies in the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion96. This new drafting of the purposes of double taxation 
conventions seems logical, at least prima facie, if we take into account that its primary goal –eliminating 
international double taxation- might encourage tax avoidance strategies rather than help to its correction97.
55. But even this new purpose attributed to double taxation conventions, certainly created by the 
89  As denounced by: Martín	JiMénez, Bulletin  for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 19. de	Broe, 
International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 321. 
90  For that reason the use of the business purpose test as an element of anti-abuse rules is not problematic if 
the GAAR also enshrines artifice requirements as is the case for the Spanish GAAR (article 15 of the Ley General 
Tributaria). The real problem appears in those cases in which business purpose test is explicitly the only parameter 
of abuse or, in those cases, as the OECD guiding principle in which business purpose test is not formally but de 
facto the unique element in order to characterize a transaction as abusive.
91  ECJ 12 September 2006, C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995, para 38.
92  ECJ 12 September 2006, C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995, para. 63.
93  ECJ 12 September 2006, C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995, para. 65.
94  As we will see in the next paragraph the special design of the guiding principle turns the main purpose ele-
ment into the only abuse requirement according to the OECD position.
95  OECD Commentaries on Art. 1 § 9.5.
96  OECD Commentaries on Art. 1 § 7.
97  It has been stated in fact that authors go on to say that, if one of the general objectives of tax treaties is to 
promote enhanced flows of International trade and investment, it is arguable that it does not matter if the desirable 
result is achieved by the direct use of tax treaties or by their indirect use (looMer, “Tax Treaty Abuse: is Canada re-
sponding effectively?”, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Working Papers 2009, no page indication).
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OECD out of thin air98, merits criticism. The main problem of this second element is that it is self-serving 
and circular99. Once it has been ascertained that the main purpose for entering into certain transactions or 
arrangements was to secure a more favourable tax position (element one) it must be determined wether or 
not that tax treatment would be contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant treaty provisions (element 
two) which is identified with the prevention of tax avoidance. One should not forget that the aim of the 
guiding principle is to define what exactly constitutes tax avoidance. Therefore, in order to decide wether 
an arrangement might be reputed abusive one should previously ascertain that it is abusive! Apart from the 
logical inconsistency, the evident risk when it comes to the application of the guiding principle is that, once 
the main purpose of securing a more favourable tax position has been proved, the abusive character of the 
arrangement be automatically concluded. In fact the risk of the second element is its practical inexistence 
and therefore it might encourage the exclusion of lawful tax planning transactions from treaty protection100.
56. Taking into account that none of the above mentioned purposes of tax treaties seem suitable 
for a purposive correction of tax avoidance under the second element of the guiding principle, we should 
reconsider the whole issue. According to this reality one should consider separately:
57. a) Treaty shopping structures. Under a different approach, one should not forget that a tax 
treaty does not merely pretend the elimination of international double taxation but pursues this objective 
based on the principle of reciprocity, which is one of the fundamental principles of tax treaty policy101. 
Even if reciprocity might not be a purpose of a double taxation convention it may well indicate how, or 
to which extent, the contracting states agree to correct double taxation. Treaty shopping breaches the 
principle of reciprocity and destroys the incentive for countries to negotiate and conclude new treaties102. 
Under this approach the reciprocity principle seems a valid purpose in order to counteract improper use 
of tax treaties. Even if this reasoning seems less circular than that enshrined in the second element of 
the OECD guiding principle, the same problem remains as to the fact that this purpose does not indicate 
when a conduit company must be reputed abusive and therefore be disregarded103. 
58. b) Rule shopping structures. It is evident that the reciprocity principle is totally alien to a pur-
posive correction of rule shopping strategies. Moreover, unless we find a purposive logic for distributive 
rules in a double taxation convention104, it seems a difficult task to correct this kind of strategies taking 
into account the purpose of the avoided or caught treaty provisions.
59. And hence we come to the real core of the problem. Taking into account that (i) none of the 
pretended purposes of tax treaties (correction of double taxation or prevention of tax avoidance and 
evasion) seem suitable for a purposive correction of the improper use of tax treaties; (ii) the principle of 
reciprocity might well be concerned by treaty shopping structures but does not allow to determine what 
is really an abuse and (iii) it seems impossible to find a teleological design behind tax treaty distributive 
rules, is it possible to construct a guiding principle or, more generally, a standard to decide wether or not 
98  arnold,  Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 249.
99  As stated by arnold	(arnold, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 249) but with dif-
ferent arguments as those exposed in this contribution.
100  As has been said according to the OECD’s view, treaties are no longer instruments to distribute tax jurisdic-
tion between two states, but instruments to ensure that income is taxed at least once in one of the states (Martín	
JiMénez, Bulletin  for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, p. 27). A critical review of the prevention of 
double non taxation as a treaty purpose in: lanG, “General Report”, Double Non Taxation (2004).
101  de	Broe,  International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse,  p. 350.
102  These are in fact the two main concerns put forward in the OECD Conduit Report against treaty Shopping. 
See: looMer, “Tax Treaty Abuse: is Canada responding effectively?”, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxa-
tion, Working Papers 2009, no page indication.
103  This explains the distinction between “treaty routing” and “treaty shopping” drawn by several authors. See: 
(looMer, “Tax Treaty Abuse: is Canada responding effectively?”, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, 
Working Papers 2009, no page indication).
104  As pretended for example by Paschen, Steuerumgenhung in nationalen und internationalen Steuerrecht, p. 
182 et seq.
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an arrangement might be considered abusive in a tax treaty context? As far as the purposive approach of 
the OECD is maintained the answer must be no.
60. The only way to properly resolve this problem is to design a standard that does not rely on the 
object and purpose of the treaty provisions but on the special characteristics of the arrangements105. In 
this context, and as we stated before, when dealing with the first component of the guiding principle, the 
key issue must be the concept of artificial arrangements. This requirement is common to many GAARs 
and therefore conceptually extended in many States106. Moreover the concept of wholly artificial arran-
gements has been repeatedly used in the case law of the ECJ on tax avoidance and recently explained in 
more detail107. Therefore a guiding principle construed on this base might match better in the European 
legal context. Last but not least, this approach resolves many of the inconsistencies present in the OECD 
Commentaries on this particular issue.
61. Defining what is a “wholly artificial arrangement” might not be an easy task. Suffice is to say 
here that this is the proper way that should be experienced in the next years.  
105  We have come to the same conclusion in a case that is quite alike to the improper use of tax treaties: Báez, 
Bad Laws Make Hard Cases: Halifax and the avoidance of inconsistent tax rules, forthcoming. 
106  ruiz-alMendral, Intertax, 2005, p. 565.
107  lanG;	heidenBauer, Wholly Artificial Arrangements, (2008), p. 597-615.
